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Introduction 
In this chapter, I provide a brief history of more than three decades of national and international efforts 
to improve labour standards for workers in the Bangladesh export garment industry. I will examine the 
different forms it took in different phases of this history and will conclude with some comments on the 
future of the industry. As someone who has been carrying out research on the industry on and off 
almost since its inception, I will be drawing on my own findings as well as the wider literature to narrate 
this history. 
Any account of achievements and failures in the efforts to improve labour standards in the Bangladesh 
industry has to be embedded in the wider context in which it is located because it helps us to 
understand why working conditions continue to fall short of international conventions and national 
regulations. While the country faces the typical difficulties of any underdeveloped country with a very 
limited history of industrialization, it has been given unusual prominence in international efforts to 
promote labour standards in global value chains. For this reason, it provides an important case study of 
the challenges encountered by these efforts when the apparent protectionism of powerful global actors 
encounters the apparent intransigence of those with relative power at the local level. 
The emergence of the export garment industry in Bangladesh 
The fact that protectionism is a major theme in this chapter is to be expected. It is dealing with a sector 
of manufacturing that has long been granted protected status in international trade by advanced 
industrialized countries, despite their stated commitment to trade liberalization. The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was set up in 1948 precisely to promote this objective through 
the gradual reduction of barriers to trade. By 1974, tariffs on trade had been reduced from an average 
of 40% in the immediate post-war period to 6% in 1974 (World Bank, 1987). However, that same year, 
trade in garments and textiles was removed from the trade liberalization framework of GATT and placed 
under the framework of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) signed by the USA, Canada and a number of 
European countries. 
The MFA was originally represented as a short-term measure to ‘facilitate’ the process of trade 
liberalization by allowing signatory countries time to make an orderly adjustment to rising imports from 
the fast-growing East Asian economies. In fact, it turned into a longer-term measure, which was 
renewed every four years on increasingly restrictive terms until it was finally phased out in 2005. Under 
the MFA’s ‘anti-surge’ clause, signatory countries were allowed to impose quotas on items imported 
from another country if the annual rate of growth in imports in these items exceeded 6% a year. 
However, in recognition of their particular development needs, the MFA allowed exemption from these 
quotas for imports from poorer developing countries. 
The recession that followed the oil price hikes in the early 1970s led several countries to invoke MFA 
quotas, primarily to curb imports from East Asian countries. At the same time, a number of their trade 
unions began to lobby for the insertion of a social clause into the rules of the MFA. This would allow 
sanctions against countries whose exports were made in conditions that violated internationally agreed 
labour standards. Although efforts to link trade sanctions to labour standards were over a century old, 
the renewed interest in the social clause was a response to re-emergence of structural unemployment 
in advanced industrial countries (Bairoch, 1999). 
The imposition of quotas gave rise to the practice of ‘quota hopping’ as East Asian capital went in search 
of new low-wage sites which were still ‘quota-free’. The export garment manufacturing industry in 
Bangladesh emerged as a result of this practice. A small number of subcontracting factories were set up 
in the country by the late 1970s with the assistance of South Korean capital and know-how. Expansion in 
the early years was slow so that even in 1983, there were only 47 such units in the country. 
This changed with the adoption of the 1982 New Industrial Policy by the Bangladesh government, which, 
in conformity with IMF conditionalities, adopted a strategy of export-oriented growth. The nascent 
garment industry was seen as a viable alternative source of foreign exchange to the country’s declining 
jute industry. Various incentives were offered by the government to encourage local entrepreneurs to 
invest in the industry. Combined with low capital requirements and an apparently unlimited supply of 
poor female labour unable to find work in the countryside, the industry offered the prospect of easy 
profits. In the absence of purpose-built industrial centres, factories were opened wherever space could 
be rented, very often in residential buildings. The industry had expanded to 700 factories by 1985 and 
grew rapidly thereafter. Estimates of the number of jobs created varied between 80,000 and 250,000 in 
1985, but it was generally agreed that 85% of them were held by women (World Bank, 1990). 
Despite the ad hoc beginnings of the industry, garment employers were able to organize themselves 
very early on to deal with the challenges of operating in the global economy, setting up the Bangladesh 
Garment Manufacturing Exporters Association (BGMEA) in 1987. The close relationship between the 
BGMEA and successive governments has allowed it to extract various concessions from successive 
governments as well to exercise a certain degree of autonomy in the governance of the industry (Khan, 
2013). 
By contrast, there was very little effort by the state to support labour in the industry. Existing labour 
legislation, which included around 51 labour laws, had been inherited largely intact from the days of 
British rule, applied only to 3% of the workforce that were in the formal sector (Mondol 2002: 121). 
Provisions for labour inspections to ensure compliance with national regulations were minimal as were 
efforts to enforce the international conventions on labour that the government signed up to. 
While the right to form unions was recognized by law, it was subject to various bureaucratic obstacles, 
including a 30% membership threshold requirement to register a new union. As a result, trade unions 
were virtually absent, not only from the garment industry but from the economy at large. Trade union 
membership accounted for less than 5% of the total workforce and only one-third of the formal 
workforce (Mondol 2002: 121). 
Other factors contributed to the low levels of unionism in the garment sector. One was the hostility of 
employers who regarded them as a disruptive force and sought either to co-opt them through 
paternalistic relationships or to repress them through a range of coercive tactics. The other was the fact 
that the unions did indeed have a history of disruptive politics. The major unions in the country were 
affiliated to its main political parties and partisan interests generally dominated over those of their 
membership (Rahman and Langford, 2012). 
Given the absence of a history of industrial development, an industrial work force and an independent 
trade union movement, both employers and workers constructed their relationships in the emerging 
export garment industry along the informal lines which prevailed in the rest of the economy. As a result, 
great deal of the industry was characterized by the absence of written contracts and by the routine 
violations of health and safety regulations, long hours of overtime often without pay, low levels of 
unionization and high rates of turnover in the work force. Not surprisingly Bangladesh began to feature 
prominently in the concerns expressed at international level about working conditions in the export 
garment sector. 
The MFA and the call for quotas 
The Bangladesh industry had its first encounter with these concerns almost as soon as it took off. In 
1985, Britain, France and the USA all invoked the ‘anti-surge’ clause of the MFA to impose quotas on 
clothing imports from Bangladesh. They argued that the rapidity with which these imports had grown 
was threatening to disrupt the domestic markets of these countries. The imposition of quotas was 
extremely punishing for an industry that was still in its infancy: ‘Shipments of garments were stopped on 
their way to the docks, investors panicked and the bottom fell out of the booming market. With no 
experience of quotas and no system in place to manage them, there was chaos’ (Jackson, 1992, p. 29). 
As quota-induced uncertainty spread, around two-thirds of the factories closed down within three 
months and over 100,000 women workers had been thrown out of work (Ahmed and Rahman, 1991, 
cited in Jackson, 1992). 
Within the UK, views supporting and opposing quotas divided along predictable lines. Associations of UK 
garment employers, trade unions and the Labour Party, which was then in opposition, argued in favour 
of renewing the MFA on more restrictive terms to insulate the domestic industry while it underwent a 
process of planned restructuring. They also favoured the introduction of a social clause in trade 
agreements to penalize countries which violated labour standards, arguing that the extremely 
exploitative conditions which prevailed in Third World factories gave their employers an unfair 
advantage in the international market. 
The opposition to a restrictive MFA came from the Thatcher government, then in power in the UK, who 
strongly espoused a free market philosophy. It pointed out that the restrictive practices permitted by 
the MFA militated against the efficient allocation of resources along lines of comparative advantage and 
represented a net cost to British consumer, who had to pay for more expensive locally produced goods. 
Opposition also came from sections of civil society but on somewhat different grounds. The World 
Development Movement (WDM) in Britain launched an influential campaign against the imposition of 
any quotas on imports from the 50 poorest countries of the world (Jackson, 1992). It argued that the 
production of clothing and textiles for a wider export market offered a promising and indeed, at that 
time, the only route, out of the ‘trade trap’ which bound so many poor countries into dependence on a 
limited range of primary commodities whose prices on world market had been in steady decline. It also 
pointed out that although ‘cheap imports from the Third World’ were frequently cited as the major 
cause of job losses in Britain, fuelling public and political support for an ever-more restrictive MFA 
stance towards the Third World, the major factor in job losses was the prevailing economic climate in 
which crippling interest rates, a soaring exchange rate and slump in domestic demand had all adversely 
affected domestic production, employment and capacity. 
Around this time, and broadly in support of the WDM position, a number of us became involved in a 
campaign organized by Tower Hamlets International Solidarity, a group based in the East End of London, 
the heart of the British clothing industry. In a report by the group, which was co-authored by Nick 
Chisolm, Swasti Mitter, Stuart Howard and myself (1986), we argued that that the quota system 
symbolized the way in which powerful countries not only wrote ‘the rules of the game’ in international 
trade, but interpreted them in their own interests. Bangladesh, for instance, was an obvious candidate 
for exemption from anti-surge quotas under the special provision of the MFA which required 
participating countries to be conscious of the problems posed by quota restrictions on exports from 
poorer countries. It was at the time one of the world’s poorest countries, second only to Ethiopia, with 
an annual per capita income of $150, less than one-hundredth of that of the USA.1 Moreover, the 
‘surges’ in question started from a very low base. In the UK, for instance, the rate of growth in imports 
from Bangladesh had indeed exceeded 6% permitted under the MFA, but in actual terms, it took 
Bangladesh’s share of total clothing imports into Britain from a mere 0.01 of total imports in 1980 to 
0.11 in 1985, a share that was totally dwarfed at all times by the more established suppliers (Jackson, 
1992). 
We called for a renewal of the MFA on terms which would facilitate a planned restructuring of the UK 
clothing industry to improve its own working conditions and adjust to growing competition from 
cheaper import. We also supported the continuation of special provisions to encourage industry in the 
poorest countries. In addition, we supported the call by the Trade Union Congress for a social clause in 
international trade agreements in order to strengthen the ability of workers’ organizations in lower 
wage economies to resist exploitation – but we added that the role of the international labour 
movement should be one of solidarity rather than covert support for protectionism. 
The outcry against quotas on clothing imports from Bangladesh led to them being lifted by Britain and 
France in 1986. By contrast, almost all items of ready-made garments exported to the USA, and many 
into Canada, continued to be governed by quotas. 
The campaign against the quotas gave me my first encounter with the power of symbolic politics, the 
use of words, metaphors and images to frame particular arguments in ways that increased their 
persuasive power, regardless of what bearing they had on the realities they claimed to depict. For 
instance, the support of the UK trade unions for quotas on imports from developing countries was 
justified at the time in terms of their opposition to the exploitation of ‘cheap’ Third World women 
workers. Elson (1983) provided a perceptive deconstruction of the meanings embedded in this 
persistent, and stigmatizing, equation of ‘Third World women’ with ‘cheap labour’. She noted how the 
equation served to legitimize demands by workers in the First World for greater protection from ‘unfair 
competition’: 
Women workers in the Third World are often stigmatised as ‘cheap labour’, willing to work 
in appalling conditions which undermines the position of women workers in the First World 
countries of North America, Western Europe and Australasia. There is often a feeling that 
Third World women are at fault; that they won’t stand up for their rights, and thus jeopardise 
any attempt by women in the First World to stand up for theirs. Tighter restrictions on 
imports of garments and textiles are often seen as the only strategy for women in the First 
World to protect themselves against the supposed menace of ‘cheap labour’ founded on 
‘oriental submissiveness’. 
(p. 6) 
She went on to point to the pejorative subtext of the discourse of ‘cheap labour’: 
The term ‘cheap labour’ carries with it condemnation of the workers themselves. There is 
something of an implication that workers who are cheap labour must be lacking in self-
respect. … Frequently, it also has racist implications when applied to non-white people – the 
implication that people of colour are ‘cheap labour’ because they are culturally backward. 
When used to describe women in the Third World (or of Third World origin) sexism and 
racism are often combined – as in the myth of the submissive Oriental girl. 
(p. 10) 
This form of symbolic politics, with its persistent tendency to conflate the characteristics of work at the 
lower end of the global value chain with the characteristics of workers who did it, has, as this chapter 
argues, remained the hallmark of Northern-led campaigns to promote labour standards in developing 
countries. 
My own position on the social clause shifted after I carried out detailed qualitative research in 1988 with 
some of the women who were working in the export garment industry (Kabeer, 2000). It was not simply 
that their accounts of their lives and struggles bore no relationship to the stereotypes of docile victims 
that would be regularly invoked in the international politics of representation. Certainly, these women 
had been drawn into the industry because it promised a better option to working for a casual daily wage 
in the fields or other people’s home, the only other options available to women with little or no 
education. Certainly, they had defied patriarchal traditions that required them to remain secluded 
within the shelter of the home and dependent on a male breadwinner for their entire life course. And 
certainly they were able to carve out some degree of agency and a better life for themselves and their 
families, despite the exploitative conditions under which they had to work. But much more importantly, 
it had become clear to many of us that that the growing support for the social clause among influential 
sections of the international labour movement was, for all its rhetoric of compassion and solidarity, 
motivated by protectionism. 
The Harkin Bill: protecting children or protecting jobs? 
The next major controversy to hit the Bangladesh industry came hard on the heels of the quota 
campaign. The neo-liberal policies promoted by the Thatcher government in the UK were mirrored in 
the policies of the Reagan administration. They led to a decline in manufacturing jobs in the USA, as 
these jobs were moved to low-wage, non-unionized offshore locations, and to a decline in union 
membership. The AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organizations), the 
leading federation of US unions, had begun to lobby sympathetic politicians for protectionist trade 
measures to halt this movement of jobs. In August 1992, in response to these efforts, Senator Harkin of 
Iowa introduced the Child Labour Deterrence Bill into the US Senate to ban imports into the USA of any 
products made partly or wholly with child labour. The bill combined a concern with the rights of the 
child with the assertion that ‘adult workers in the USA and other developed countries should not have 
their jobs imperilled by imports produced by child labour in developing countries’ (cited in Brooks, 2007: 
p. 6). 
American unions had already been drawing attention to the issue of child labour in the Bangladesh 
industry and in December 2002, NBC aired a programme on the use of child labour in Bangladeshi 
factories that supplied Walmart (Nielsen, 2005). Along with its concern for these children, the 
programme also promoted another message. This was communicated by a prominent American trade 
unionist who appeared on the programme to declare: ‘for every child working in a Bangladesh garment 
factory, there is an adult American out of a job’. 
The programme was described by observers on the ground as a ‘highly unbalanced and sensationalised 
account’ of the situation of children in the garment industry (Bissell and Sobhan, 1996) but it had the 
desired effect. Various supporters of the Harkin Bill, which included AAFLI (Asian-American Free Labour 
Institute), the international division of AFL-CIO as well as the US Child Labour Coalition were able to 
mobilize public opinion behind the call for a boycott of Bangladeshi clothing imports. 
Employers reacted immediately to this unwelcome publicity, laying off child workers en masse. It quickly 
became clear to development organizations within Bangladesh that this would not end child labour, but 
merely push it into far more hazardous and exploitative forms of work (Boyden, 2003; Bissell and 
Sobhan, 1996). Concern with the fate of retrenched children led United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund  and a number of local non-governmental agencies to call for some kind of ‘holding’ 
operation until a more satisfactory alternative to immediate dismissal could be worked out. 
After prolonged negotiations, in which the BGMEA participated on condition that AAFLI was excluded, 
an agreement was arrived at (Nielson, 2005). However, the final memorandum that was signed by the 
BGMEA, the ILO and UNICEF was not the one that met with the unanimous approval of all three 
signatories. Their preferred version would have permitted some light, part-time regulated factory work 
for children in the 12–14 age group along with school attendance. However, this was rejected by US 
buyers because of ‘the perceptions of the Western consuming public’ who, it was claimed, would be 
satisfied only with the complete elimination of all child labour from the factories Bissell and Sobhan, 
1996)). 
‘Unfair’ trade: debating the social clauseelson has pointed out, the themes that played 
out during this episode in the history of Bangladesh’s export garment industry were reproduced in 
broader debates about the social clause that were being played out in international forums. 
Arguments made by US unions in favour of the social clause routinely drew on working conditions and 
workers in the Bangladesh industry to bolster their case. Thus US trade union leaders seeking to make 
their case for the social clause referred contemptuously to the ‘culturally passive Islamic women 
toiling 60 hours a week and making less than $30 a month’ to swell the profits of US corporations 
(Collingsworth et al., 1994: p. 8). 
At the same time, the issues raised by the case of child labour in the Bangladesh industry were cited by 
Rao (1999), an advocate of the social clause, as an example of its counterproductive potential when 
their consequences for workers had not been thought through: 
A social clause that forces employers to improve labour standards would necessitate greater 
investment in human resources. If employers are not willing to do this or if wages rise, they 
may resort to greater mechanisation in order to cut down on labour costs. Labour will then 
be displaced. In other words, there may be a trade-off between the right to better labour 
standards and the right to work. 
In 1995 the newly established World Trade Organization took over from GATT in setting the rules for 
international trade. The decision had already been taken that the MFA would be phased out by 2005 
and the WTO would become responsible for regulating the trade in garment and textiles. The US 
government led demands at the very first WTO ministerial meeting in 1996 for the insertion of a social 
clause into WTO rules so that it could exercise oversight of labour standards in exporting countries. 
In a review of the debates about the social clause, Pahle (2010) uses as his point of departure the 
attempt by Van Roozendaal (2002) to pose the divisions between supporters and opponents in terms of 
a clear-cut ideological dichotomy between interventionist and neo-liberal politics. The reality, as he 
notes, is far more complex. 
There is no doubt that advocates of neo-liberal policies were adamantly opposed to the social clause on 
the grounds that linking labour standards to trade agreements would distort market forces and erode 
the comparative advantage of labour-abundant, low-wage economies in the Global South (Bhagwati, 
1996). This position was also supported by many governments in the Global South on grounds which 
echoed the arguments of neoclassical economists but also added concerns about national sovereignty 
into the mix. 
Those in favour of the social clause included a larger number of Northern governments and trade 
unions, the latter led by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the global voice 
of organized labour in these debates. The ICFTU had sought to frame the social clause as a measure to 
uphold basic labour rights of workers within international trade in order to prevent a ‘race to the 
welfare bottom’. The question that Pahle set out to investigate was why, in spite of the ICFTU having 
conducted ‘the most wide-ranging [campaign] in the history of the union movement’ (ICFTU, 1999 cited 
in Pahle, 2010) in support of this position, it ‘failed to secure sufficient support for the proposal from its 
own southern constituents, and from civil society more broadly’ (Pahle, p. 390). Why was a proposal 
that it saw as a kind of ‘freedom fighter’ on behalf of workers in the Global South regarded by the 
representatives of these workers as more akin to a ‘terrorist’. 
He suggests that a major factor behind this outcome was that the most powerful Northern trade unions 
and the AFL-CIO, in particular, were not at all wedded to the ICFTU position. Their support for the social 
clause was as a protectionist trade measure that would help to lessen the effects of ‘unfair’ trade on 
workers in the north. As Pahle notes, the concept of ‘unfair’ trade within US trade policy referred 
unequivocally to what foreign competitors’ practices did to US firms and their workers, not to the 
effects of these practices on firms and workers within the competitors’ own national contexts. 
Consequently, the support of US unions for upholding labour standards in the low-wage economies of 
the Global South were consistently couched in terms of the interests of American workers – the 
argument that had featured in the case of the Harkin Bill – making it difficult for the alternative framing 
of fair trade to defend workers’ rights to gain much purchase in the international debates. 
It was the dominance of this protectionist framing of social clause arguments over the solidaristic one 
that explains why resistance to the social clause went beyond governments of developing countries to 
many trade unions, non-governmental organizations as well as progressive academics. For instance, 
Bhattacharya (1996), a Bangladeshi economist not known for his neoclassical/neo-liberal sentiments, 
criticized the steady rise of ‘neo-protectionism’ by advanced industrialized countries in the shape of 
‘non-tariff’ barriers which explicitly targeted those labour-intensive products in which developing 
countries had a competitive advantage. He pointed to the MFA as one example of such barriers, the 
proposed social clause as another. 
The intensity of the opposition to the social clause in the run-up to the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Seattle, 1999 brought together an unexpected coalition of southern trade unions, civil society 
organizations, think tanks as well as a number of neoclassical, institutionalist as well as feminist scholars 
who signed the ‘Third World Intellectuals and NGOs Statement against Linkage’ (TWIN-SAL) (1999).2 
They declared their unambiguous opposition to the linkage of labour and environmental standards to 
WTO and trade treaties and took issue with attempts to represent their position in terms of corporate 
interests and malign governments. They acknowledged that many who supported the social clause may 
have been sincere and well-intentioned in their concerns about workers’ rights but charged that their 
legitimate concerns were being ‘contaminated’ by powerful protectionist lobbies who sought to blunt 
international competition from developing countries by raising their costs of production. 
They suggested that failure to reach agreement on the social clause reflected the fact that it was an 
attempt to use the WTO to achieve two very different objectives: the liberalization of trade and the 
advancement of social agendas. They supported the idea that the WTO be tasked with the liberalization 
agenda while recommending that appropriate international organizations, such as the ILO and UNICEF, 
be made responsible for the social agenda along with civil society organizations in developing countries. 
The TWIN-SAL statement also touched on other concerns which had been expressed by those who 
opposed the social clause. One was the hypocrisy of countries that were calling for the social clause 
despite evidence that their own track record on labour rights was extremely flawed. For instance only 
12% of US labour force was in trade unions at the time, due in no small part to restrictive legislation 
dismantling workers’ rights in that country. Moreover, the USA had systematically failed to sign key ILO 
conventions on labour rights, including the clause on forced labour, continuing to use prison labour in 
the manufacture of goods in a violation of ILO conventions. There was also a concern about how 
asymmetries of power in the international trading system would play out within the WTO. Could 
smaller, less powerful countries like Bangladesh use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures to 
demand trade sanctions against the USA for its violation of ILO conventions? What would be the political 
fallout from doing so (Raghavan, 1996; Thoene, 2014)? 
Efforts to incorporate a workers’ rights clause into the WTO were defeated at the Ministerial Conference 
at Doha in 2001 and debates about the issue died down, at least within multilateral trade forums. But 
the USA increasingly incorporated provisions about labour standards into its bilateral agreements with 
its trading partners. 
Campaigning for corporate social responsibility 
While Northern trade unions led advocacy in favour of linking trade and labour standards in 
international forums, they were also active in the street-level politics of the anti-sweatshop movement 
which took off in the 1990s. Mainly based in the USA, the movement brought together trade unions, 
consumer groups, church groups, human rights activists, students and others with the aim of mobilizing 
consumer outrage about the conditions in which their garments were made in order to put pressure on 
global brands and buyers to take greater responsibility for working conditions in the factories from 
which they sourced their garments. 
Their strategy to achieve this relied heavily on the politics of representation in a particularly negative 
form: ‘a language of horror, of sensationalized narratives generalized from individual stories that may or 
may not be representative’ (Siddiqi, 2009) but which was crafted to ‘inflame’ (Ross, 1997, p. 10) the 
conscience of consumers in the north. Their relentless focus on the victimhood of women and children 
working in global value chains was not accidental. Research into consumer behaviour had suggested 
that it was far easier to persuade consumers to avoid commodities that had been produced under 
negative conditions than to seek out those that had been produced in conditions that respect workers’ 
rights (Elliot and Freeman, 2003). This meant that anti-sweatshop discourses were most likely to be 
effective in their pressure to get corporations to act when they framed women workers in the Global 
South as victims of ruthless global capitalism than as agents capable of protesting their conditions of 
work in solidarity with others. 
In a collection of articles brought together to mark the ‘Year of the Sweatshop’, Bangladeshi workers 
made an appearance in a particularly sensationalized form. Elinor Spielberg (1997), who was associated 
with UNITE, the garment workers union within AFL-CIO, offered a contribution based on what appeared 
to have been a brief and cursory visit to the country in 1994. She began her account with the 
extraordinary claim that ‘there’s a saying among the girls in the slums of Bangladesh: if you are lucky, 
you’ll be a prostitute – if you’re unlucky, you’ll be a garment worker’ (p. 113). Despite having done 
extensive research with garment workers by then, I had found no evidence for this saying either in my 
own research (Kabeer, 2000) or among other researchers and activists who had been working in the 
urban slums of Bangladesh for many years (a point also made by Siddiqi, 2009). As in many other 
countries in the world, particularly in sexually conservative societies like Bangladesh, prostitution 
remains possibly the most socially stigmatized of occupations. 
Spielberg goes onto make a number of other extraordinary statements about the garment workers she 
met but what stands out among these is her detailed description of the condition of the feet of a young 
garment she encountered, a description she links, improbably, to working conditions in the girl’s 
garment factory: 
Whatever early malnutrition had started doing to her chances of marriage, the garment trade 
had finished off. The mind cannot register, in the first few seconds, that these appendages 
are attached to a creature that walks upright on the ground. They have flattened and spread 
out to such a degree they seem more suited to one that propels itself in the water. Like fins. 
Like flounders, but curved in toward each other: bottom fish that got trapped, and grew, 
inside a kidney-shaped pan. The mind tries to grasp hold of something more noble, 
something scientific perhaps, to explain why a child, a child who is now admiring her new 
plastic bangles and smoothing the hem of her best dress, has been cursed with feet like that 
on which to toil. Compensation: now that’s a scientific word. The bones of her feet were too 
weak to support the weight of the body, so they accommodated the floor. 
(p. 114) 
While the kind of malnutrition she describes is widespread among poorer children, particularly girls, in 
Bangladesh, it reflects economic deprivation and gender discrimination since birth in an underdeveloped 
and patriarchal society rather than the effects of a few years’ work in the garment industry. Its inclusion 
in her account helps to establish her credentials as a caring moral being but it reduces the young girl to 
the status of ‘a creature’, almost a different species, while testifying to the dehumanizing conditions 
that her union claimed to be campaigning against. 
The anti-sweatshop movement has, without doubt, been extremely effective in raising awareness 
among Northern consumers about the conditions in which their clothes were made and helping to 
invest private acts of consumption with political meaning (Balsiger, 2010). Moreover, it has had an 
impact beyond the transnational corporations (TNCs) that were the direct targets of their campaigns. 
Today most corporations with a brand image to protect seek to pre-empt such campaigns by building 
their own reputation for corporate social responsibility. This has generally entailed developing their own 
codes of conduct, based on some or all of the ILO’s ‘core labour standards’, and incorporating them into 
contracts with their suppliers in low-wage economies. 
National regulation and corporate codes of conduct 
By the late 1990s, Bangladesh industry had experienced the same proliferation of corporate codes of 
conduct that was occurring in supplier factories across global value chains. Bangladeshi employers were 
also beginning to realize that compliance with these codes was becoming as important for their ability 
to compete in global markets as low labour costs and capacity to deliver on time. There was also 
evidence that the government was making efforts to improve the national regulatory framework, albeit 
very slowly. A commission had been set up in 1992 with a view to developing a unified labour legislation 
that would cover workers in both formal and informal sectors. The draft code was drawn up in 1994, but 
it is indicative of the obstacles it encountered that it was not till 2006 that the law was finalized. 
The new legislation included a number of important measures relating to wages and working condition 
of workers in Bangladesh but it had many shortcomings, including continued restrictions relating to the 
formation of trade unions. To compensate for the absence of unions, it required employers of 
establishments with more than 50 workers to set up participation committees, made up of 
representatives of management and of workers, the latter either nominated by management or elected 
by workers. This was intended as a platform for social dialogue between management and workers as 
well as to encourage various forms of training, monitor application of labour laws and ensure production 
targets were met. 
In order to find out whether these various efforts had resulted in progress on workers’ rights and 
working conditions, Simeen Mahmud and I undertook a number of studies between 2000 and 2006. We 
carried out a survey in 2001 to compare how workers fared in export garment factories and in informal 
wage labour in urban areas, their most likely alternative. We found evidence of improvement in working 
conditions in the garment sector, more markedly in the EPZs, where factories were more likely to be 
joint ventures but also in locally owned factories. These relate mainly to paid leave, maternity leave, 
overtime pay and medical care. In comparison to informal wage workers, they were more likely to 
report paid leave, maternity leave, overtime pay and medical care. They also earned more, and while 
they worked longer hours, they were much less likely to have been without work in the past year and 
more likely to report an increase in their income. However, there were two telling indicators of the 
limits to what had been achieved: less than 5% of the garment workers reported a presence of a trade 
union in their workplace and only around 20% had heard of the country’s labour laws (Kabeer and 
Mahmud 2004a). 
We also carried out qualitative research with various stakeholders in the garment industry in 2004 
(Mahmud and Kabeer, 2006). Our interviews with employers suggested that while membership of the 
BGMEA had helped to formalize their relationships with each other and with the state, their 
relationships with their workers remained rooted in the culture of the informal economy. Some had 
been shamed into improving working conditions by the negative image that the industry had acquired in 
the international arena but they were a minority. 
Many of the employers we interviewed expressed the belief that their workers had no discipline and did 
not expect or deserve to be treated like a formal work force: ‘…they don’t like to work under any rules. 
They work for some days, if they need to go home they leave without any notice and come back to join 
another factory’ (p. 232). Yet these employers had benefited as a group from considerable state 
support, more than any other group of employers and, according to the laws of the country, they owed 
a great deal more to their workers than the simple generation of jobs. Seen in this light, corporate codes 
of conduct could be interpreted as attempts on the part of international buyers to enforce the social 
responsibility obligations of their suppliers, given their failure to do so voluntarily and the failure of the 
state to compel them. 
From the employers’ perspective, on the other hand, corporate codes of conduct were simply another 
set of conditions imposed by global brands and buyers, along with production deadlines and quality 
control, the costs of which they were forced to bear in order to stay in business. They saw the codes as a 
public relations exercise on the part of global brands that were concerned about their public image so as 
to maintain a facade of social responsibility for their consumers while covertly passing the cost of 
compliance onto their suppliers. They complained with bitterness about the double standards of 
companies who combined their demands for increasingly onerous and expensive quality and labour 
standards with a steady reduction in the prices they offered to their producers. As one employer who 
has been in the industry for many years commented: 
There is no such thing as a permanent contract in this business. None of the buyers will give 
you a permanent contract and say okay, we have booked orders with your factory for at least 
the next two years…. They will work from contract to contract and demand shorter and 
shorter delivery times. 
(p. 233) 
Thus, if local suppliers profited from keeping their relationships with their workers as informal as 
possible, using the threat of dismissal to discipline their workers, international buyers in turn exercised 
their monopsony-like power in the global market for clothing to keep their relationship with their 
producers as informal as possible, using the constant threat of relocation to create a permanent 
condition of insecurity among suppliers across the world. 
Nor did we find much grounds for hope that the main trade unions in the country would step in on 
behalf of workers. As Dannecker had noted in her research, many of their leaders viewed female 
garment workers as passive products of rural backgrounds, illiteracy and general lack of awareness: 
Since the women are illiterate they do not understand what a labour union is and that we 
are trying to improve their working conditions. We visit them but they hardly listen to us 
because they cannot grasp the idea of solidarity and unity. 
(Dannecker 2002: 222) 
But our conversations with workers suggested that they had not remained untouched by the forces of 
change in the larger society. Intense media coverage of their working conditions, increased attempts to 
mobilize them by a wide range of actors, including local and international trade unions, labour rights 
organizations and women’s organizations, had all served to raise their knowledge and awareness of 
their rights. The workers we interviewed reported various cases when they had come together, 
sometimes spontaneously, sometimes in a planned and coordinated way, to undertake factory-wide 
protests which often spilled out onto the streets. 
We concluded on the basis of their accounts: 
There is …no linear story of progress that emerges out of these accounts, of victories gained 
leading on to further victories. Some workers felt that conditions had improved after a 
protest, some felt they had worsened. Employers made promises in order to quell a 
disturbance, but used every pretext subsequently to victimise or get rid of the leaders. 
However, changes in consciousness were often permanent and the leadership that 
developed did not simply fade away when a struggle was lost but went on to other factories 
to start the job of organisation once again 
(p. 240) 
In fact, very soon after we had completed out research, these piecemeal and isolated protests escalated 
in 2006 into the largest mobilization of garment workers in the history of the RMG sector in Bangladesh. 
It was led by two independent leftist unions – neither part of the mainstream movement nor of the 
organizations being promoted by international trade unions (Rahman and Langford, 2012). The 
government responded to these protests by raising the minimum wage which had been frozen since 
1994. They raised them again in 2010, in 2014 and then again in 2018. Each such raise was preceded by 
a period of agitation by workers. 
From compliance to cooperation: multi-stakeholder initiatives after 
Rana Plaza 
Codes of conduct have become an accepted part of doing business in global value chains but their 
effects in Bangladesh – as elsewhere – have been mixed. The improvements we noted in our study, and 
those that have taken place subsequently, have taken place in an ad hoc and uncoordinated way, 
manifestations of what we called a ‘culture of compliance’ with corporate codes of conduct rather a 
‘culture of accountability’ to national legislation (Mahmud and Kabeer, p. 240). Furthermore, these 
improvements were largely focused on various aspects of working conditions within the factories, rather 
than on infrastructural conditions, despite the series of fires and industrial disasters that occurred 
periodically over the industry’s history. 
The scale of the tragedy at Rana Plaza in April 2013 provided a much needed wake-up call. The death of 
over a thousand garment workers and the injury of many more galvanized a range of institutional actors 
at global and local levels into action. Pressure from Western governments, especially the suspension of 
the Generalized System of Preferences facility by the USA and threats to do so by the EU, prompted the 
Bangladesh government to act. In July 2013, it signed a Sustainability Compact with the EU, the USA, 
Canada and the ILO whereby it agreed to take immediate and longer term measures to address health 
and safety in the RMG sector. 
The Bangladesh Labour Act 2006 was amended to promote work place safety and to bring into line with 
international conventions. Among various changes, it made it obligatory that workers’ representatives 
on the WPCs were elected rather than nominated by management. Health and safety committees had 
to be set up in factories with more than 50 workers, with worker representatives drawn from trade 
unions or the WPCs. However, it left the 30% threshold requirement to form unions intact. There was a 
rise in the number of new unions that were registered in the aftermath of these changes (Anner, 2018), 
but the momentum could not be maintained in the face of resistance from  government and employers. 
The other major response to Rana Plaza was the adoption of the two major multi-stakeholder 
agreements.3 These were seen as exemplifying a new cooperation-based, multi-stakeholder approach to 
CSR in place of the buyer-driven, compliance-based approach of the codes of conduct. The Accord was 
signed by more than 200 international brands from 20 mainly European countries, two European-based 
international unions (UNI Global Union and IndustriAll Global Union) and eight of their associated labour 
federations in Bangladesh. It represented a departure from past agreements of this kind in its legally 
binding nature: all signatories agreed that arbitration awards or the enforcement of fees could be 
pursued in the relevant national legal systems. A counterpart agreement, the Alliance, was signed by 28 
mainly US-based firms: it had limited union participation and, due to the reluctance of US firms, was not 
legally binding. 
The initiatives were envisioned to last till 2018.4 Funding was provided through annual contributions by 
buyers. The objective was to list all firms supplying the signatory companies, to send inspection teams to 
ensure that their structural and safety conditions complied with national building regulations and to 
draw up corrective recommendations where necessary to be implemented by managers within a 
prescribed time frame. Factories that did not comply were disqualified from further business with the 
signatory firms. As of April 2018, Accord had inspected 2,022 factories while Alliance had inspected 836 
factories, around 50% of which were shared with Accord (Barrett et al., 2018). 
In 2017, Simeen Mahmud and I joined a larger team of researchers to assess the impact of these 
initiatives from the perspective of workers, while others on the team explored the managers’ 
perspectives5. We found that many of the health and safety requirements associated with the Accord 
and Alliance had been carried out, not only but most significantly in factories affiliated with these 
initiatives. We also found significant evidence of ‘spill over’ effects on outcomes which were not covered 
by the agreements, including higher wages, more permanent contracts, greater likelihood of elected 
participation committees and greater knowledge of both labour laws and codes of conduct (Kabeer et 
al., 2019). 
Based on the workers’ survey alone, our conclusion would have been that the new multi-stakeholder 
approach to corporate responsibility had achieved some important outcomes – or at least made them 
more likely. But this account of change was made more complex by the findings reported by the study of 
managers of AA-affiliated factories carried out as part of the same project (Rahman and Rahman, 2018). 
Their initial response to the AA agreements had been favourable: they welcomed what promised to be a 
coordinated framework for improving health and safety conditions in their factories and the opportunity 
to improve the country’s international reputation. 
But this gave way to considerable dissatisfaction. While they complained about various technical 
problems that had proved costly for them, their greatest bitterness was reserved for the fact that while 
buyers paid for the costs of inspections, the costs of expensive remediation or relocation measures had 
to be borne by the employers (Barret et al., 2018). 
The expectation on the part of suppliers that these costs would be shared was based on the terms of the 
Accord agreement which had spelt out the responsibilities of the signatory companies towards their 
suppliers. According to Article 28 of Accord: ‘participating brands and retailers will negotiate commercial 
terms with their suppliers which ensure that it is financially feasible for the factories to maintain safe 
workplaces and comply with upgrade and remediation requirements instituted by the Safety Inspector’. 
Yet none of 109 managers interviewed by Rahman and Rahman had received any assistance in 
implementing the recommendations advised by inspectors. While larger factories were generally able to 
finance these measures through profits or loans, small and medium firms found it a major struggle, 
many going out of business.6 
Furthermore, lead firms had continued to pursue ‘business as usual’ purchasing practices that went 
directly against the financial feasibility of local suppliers. Not only did they fail to increase the 
procurement prices paid to local suppliers, one way to have offset some of the remediation costs 
incurred by the latter, but the prices they paid to their suppliers in Bangladesh continued their long-
term decline. According to the results of a survey of factory managers by Anner (2018): 
the average FOB price was USD 4.64 in 2016, which is a 7.79% decline from a FOB price point 
of USD 5.03 in 2011. If we look at exports to the United States, the price point declined by 
10.67%. For European buyers, the price point came down by 9.04%. Indeed, in all major 
product categories we find a decline in nominal prices paid per unit. 
Evidence from other sources supports this trend of declining prices which continued after Rana Plaza, a 
decline that could not be explained by the rising price of raw materials or fluctuations in exchange rates 
(Anner, 2018). Also part of the ‘business as usual’ approach was the continued reduction of delivery 
times. In 2011, the major global brands had  given Bangladesh factories an average of 94 days to 
complete an order. By 2016, it had declined to 86 days. With production costs, including wages, going up 
and purchasing prices declining, the only way that supplier factories could remain in business was by 
reducing their profit margins. This was indeed the case. Anner’s survey (2018) of 223 managers found 
that profit margins had decreased by 13.3% between 2011 and 2016 leaving managers with a mean 
profit margin of 7.69%. 
It would appear therefore that while the shift from a compliance to cooperation-based model of CSR 
had improved structural safety in the garment industry, it had left intact certain fundamental 
asymmetries in relationships within global value chains. The externalization of corporate social 
responsibility by the buyers associated with the new agreements and the complaints they gave rise to 
on the part of managers were uncannily similar to our findings in relation to the codes of conduct that 
we had reported earlier. 
The persistence of these asymmetries of power within the garment supply chain helps to explain what 
emerged as certain key sticking points in the processes of change that were recorded by our workers’ 
survey. These related to the level of wages, with the majority of workers reporting them to be 
inadequate; long working hours and the use of compulsory overtime; the mistreatment of workers, 
generally associated with the failure to meet production targets; and the continued hostility towards 
trade unions that might seek to challenge these practices. Some of this resistance to change can clearly 
be attributed to the continued intransigence of a group of employers who refused to accord dignity and 
respect to those who worked for them. But it also reflected the continuing insecurities associated with 
competing in the global market for clothing with no assurance that compliance with CSR requirements 
would improve the terms on which they do business with global buyers.7 
‘Looking in the wrong place?’ from spotlight to flood light perspectives 
The key ‘sticking points’ in processes of change that we recorded through our workers’ survey related to 
conditions at work that might well be worse in Bangladesh than other garment exporting countries, but 
they are by no means unique to it. Rather they are endemic to the organization of global supply chains. 
As Locke (2013) pointed out on the basis of his study of these supply chains, despite initiatives of various 
kinds, include private compliance programmes as well as efforts at capacity building, ‘poor working 
conditions, excessive working hours, precarious employment practices and low wages persist in 
factories producing for global supply chains’ (p. 126). 
He suggested that if we wanted to understand why problems of working conditions are so pervasive and 
persistent in garment value chains, we would be looking in the wrong place if we focus only on the 
factories where these problems are manifested. We need to move from a narrow ‘spotlight’ perspective 
on working conditions in global value chains, a perspective that draws our gaze to the locus of 
production alone, to a ‘flood light’ approach which illuminates the broader political economy of supply 
chain capitalism within which these production processes are located. 
Bangladesh entered the global garment industry at a time when the retail sector became increasingly 
concentrated, particularly in the USA and Europe, investing a small number of global brands and 
retailers with disproportionate bargaining power vis-à-vis the large, and growing, number of suppliers 
dispersed in low-wage economies across the developing world. Competition in the global apparel 
industry further intensified when the quotas permitted under the MFA were phased out, effectively 
marking the end of the MFA by 2005. The increased liberalization of trade expanded the number of 
countries from which buyers could source, allowing them to play suppliers in increasing numbers of 
countries against each other (Anner et al., 2012). 
This was also a period that saw the rise of a new ‘fast fashion’ business model based on a greater variety 
of cheap clothing delivered faster and more frequently to retail outlets. Studies have shown that the fast 
fashion retailing has been particularly inimical to the observance of decent wages and working 
conditions across the global industry (Anner et al., 2012). Global brands and buyers have been able to 
use the increasingly unequal distribution of bargaining power within these chains to pressure their 
suppliers to meet the competitive pressures within the industry by producing smaller batches of 
increasing varieties of products more rapidly and at decreasing prices. 
Even if some global buyers did make efforts to improve labour standards among their suppliers, and 
even if some suppliers were responsive to these efforts, the ‘upstream’ business practices associated 
with fast fashion retailing inevitably undermined its ‘downstream’ CSR efforts. Faced with CSR practices 
which increased the production costs of suppliers, and purchasing practices which reduced the prices 
they received, suppliers had a limited range of options: to reduce their profit margins, pay their workers 
lower wages, demand longer hours of work, subcontract out their work to lower cost units and take 
short cuts in safety standards. 
The implications of these sourcing practices for labour standards within value chains have been by 
Anner et al. (2012) using US data. They found that the nominal price per square metre of imported 
clothing into the USA increased from $3.48 in 1989 to $3.77 in 1997 but had declined to $2.89 in 2010. 
This represented a drop of 23% in nominal dollar prices but 48% in real dollar price over this period. In 
addition, they found that while respect for the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining 
was relatively steady in the 1990s among the top 20 garment exporters to the USA, it began to decline 
significantly after 2001. In fact, prices, and presumably respect for workers’ rights, were highest in 2010 
among those countries who had faced greatest decline in their share of US markets. 
Consumers have been mobilized to put pressure on global brands to improve conditions in their supplier 
factories but the strength of their stake in this outcome is not clear. Some authors believe that 
consumers have demonstrated their willingness to pay higher prices for clothes made in decent working 
conditions (Ross, 1997; Prasad et al. 2004). It is certainly the case that consumer outrage, or the fear of 
it, was a driving force behind the various CSR efforts that have come into existence since the 1990s. Yet 
consumer outrage has not been sustained enough or powerful enough to force a change in business 
practices. 
Other authors have been less sanguine about the power or motivation of consumers. An early OXFAM 
report (2004) appears to suggest that they may have been co-opted into the fast fashion model: 
‘…consumers have come to expect high quality and year-round availability at “value” prices. Many 
retailers and brands compete to capture their loyalty through new products, short fashion cycles, and 
price wars, and so increase their own market share’ (p. 36). And more recently, Taplin (2014) observes, 
‘Western consumers have become accustomed to cheap fashion and for the most part appear unwilling 
to pay more for items that are untainted by exploitative practices’ (p. 73).8 
Reviewing the confluence of forces that led to Rana Plaza, Taplin concludes that the fast fashion 
business model that dominates global value chains has created a situation ‘where the “villains” are 
many and the innocent caught up in the manifold uncertainties that such a model produces’ (p. 73). In 
such a situation, industrial disasters like Rana Plaza are not only highly likely, but almost inevitable. 
Assessing recommendations for the way forward 
The question that this raises is what can be done to protect ‘the innocent’? One of the striking features 
of successive efforts to enforce labour standards in developing countries is the extent to which the main 
burden of proposed change generally devolves almost entirely on stakeholders in the Global South. The 
campaign around the ‘social clause’ in the 1990s, for instance, placed the responsibility for upholding 
labour standards on the governments of developing countries. While anti-sweatshop campaigns put 
pressure on global buyers and brands to adopting corporate codes of conduct, the actual responsibility 
and costs of implementing these codes fell squarely on supplying factories. And as we noted, the Accord 
and Alliance agreements have also externalized the costs of making the factories safer to local suppliers. 
Locke suggests the need for new institutional arrangements and political coalitions which would 
reallocate costs and rewards among all stakeholders engaged in these value chains, thus transcending 
traditional boundaries between producers and consumers, buyers and suppliers, NGOs and 
corporations, advanced and developing countries. Given the power dynamics that characterize supply 
chain capitalism, it is difficult to envisage what these arrangements might be and how they might 
emerge but the proposal does at least represent a shift from a ‘spotlight’ perspective on the problem to 
a ‘floodlit’ one. By way of conclusion, we discuss some recent recommendations for advancing the 
transition to a fairer set of institutional arrangements. We will draw in particular on Sobhan (2014) to 
discuss the specific challenges of the Bangladesh context. 
We begin with the proposal put forward by the Stern Centre for Business and Human Rights for what 
they call a ‘shared responsibility model’. It is intended to respond to the immediate challenge of 
addressing remaining health and safety conditions in the RMG industry in Bangladesh after Accord and 
Alliance agreements come to an end (Barrett et al., 2018). It calls for an international task force, led by 
Bangladeshi stakeholders, to coordinate efforts to raise the funds necessary to complete this task and to 
oversee the implementation process. Along with the Bangladeshi government and RMG employers, the 
proposal envisages financial contributions from international actors, including Western buyers and the 
countries that import garments from Bangladesh – mainly EU and the USA who account for 64% and 
18% of Bangladesh’s garment exports respectively. 
While there are self-evident reasons why the Bangladesh government and employers should take lead 
responsibility for improving conditions in the RMG sector, the case made by the Stern proposal for 
involving Western buyers and governments is based on appeals to their sense of fairness and their 
‘special obligations’. Yet the commitment expressed by these actors to economic justice for workers in 
global value chains calls for a stronger and more institutionalized model of shared responsibility, one 
based on a fairer distribution of rights and responsibilities across the value chain, rather than on special 
pleading. 
Estimates of the distribution of gains across the value chain have shown that local suppliers retain a very 
small share of the final retail price of their products. An attempt by Asia Foundation (cited in Kabeer and 
Mahmud, 2004b) to break down the cost components of a shirt made in Bangladesh and retailing in the 
USA for $13 found that just 38% of the value of the final retail price was retained by Bangladeshi 
suppliers. This had to cover all their costs, including fabric (23%), labour (1.2%), trim (0.24%), and all 
other operating costs, including their profits (2.01%). 
Norfield (2011) carried out a similar exercise for a T-shirt retailing in H&M stores in Germany for 4.95 
euros. He estimated that H&M paid the Bangladeshi supplier 1.35 euros for a T-shirt (around 27%). This 
had to cover 0.40 euro for raw cotton material purchased from the USA, leaving 95 cents to cover labour 
costs, power costs, the cost of materials other than cotton, depreciation of machinery and other items 
as well as the suppliers’ own profit. The rest of the final price of the shirt was made up of 0.06 euro for 
shipping costs to Germany, 2.00 euros for transport, shop rents, sales force, marketing and 
administration in Germany, 0.60 euro net profit per shirt and then an additional 0.70 euro, representing 
the 19% VAT levied by member states in EU countries on all goods and services bought and sold within 
the EU. 
Similar estimates are provided by Sobhan with regard to shirts made in Bangladesh and retailed in 
Walmart stores in the USA. He estimates that 29% of the final retail price was retained by the 
Bangladeshi supplier to cover the cost of fabric; rental, local transport, administrative overheads; and 
the suppliers’ profit. But he makes the additional point that there is generally very little information on 
how much of the final retail price that goes to Walmart was used to cover its costs and how much 
represented the political rents it was able to enjoy by virtue of its monopsony power within the global 
value chain. 
Western buyers have not shown much inclination to redistribute some of their profits as their 
contribution to sharing the costs of corporate responsibility but their governments are in a position to 
make a difference. As Norfield’s estimate shows, a sizeable portion of the revenue generated by 
garment value chain production is claimed by EU governments in the form of VAT. In the case of the 
USA, government revenue is collected in the form of tariffs on imports, with higher tariffs (15%) being 
imposed on textile and garments than any other imports. As Bain (2018) points out: 
The reason for the high tariffs is classic—and many might say outdated—
protectionism….[E]ven though the US textile industry has dwindled to a tiny share of what 
it once was, the small manufacturers that remain exert a strong hold on their political 
representatives, who fight for them in trade deals. 
One consequence of this, as Bain (2018) notes, is that Bangladesh has been paying higher tariffs than 
any of the other 232 countries that export to the USA because it is primarily an exporter of garments. As 
Sobhan points out, the tariff revenue of around $720 million raised annually from Bangladesh by the 
US government is considerably greater than $200 million a year that the USA provided in overseas aid 
to Bangladesh9: ‘the paradox of a net transfer of resources from Bangladesh, a least developed country, 
to the budget of the world’s wealthiest country’ (Sobhan, p. 6). 
The concern that governments in the USA and the EU have expressed about the rights of workers in the 
countries from which they import their clothing surely implies commensurate obligations on their part. 
These could be met by routinely redistributing some of the revenue they collect from imports from 
Bangladesh and other lower-income exporting countries back to the countries in question both to 
ensure that their exporting industries have the resources to provide decent working conditions and to 
promote mechanisms, including those exercised by civil society, to hold the industry accountable. 
Aside from the recommendations contained in the Stern Centre, the literature on labour standards 
contains a variety of studies and recommendations relating to various local-level efforts to improve 
working conditions and build skills and organizational capacity in garment factories by national and 
international trade unions, labour rights NGOs as well as by multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the 
ILO’s Better Works Programme. Others have stressed the importance of strengthening and enforcing 
national regulations. As Locke suggests, each of these has limited impact on its own but can mutually 
reinforce each other to amplify impact. 
However, the question of the national regulation is clearly problematic in Bangladesh. The failures of 
government oversight that have contributed to the conditions prevailing in the garment sector are part 
of a broader crisis of governance failure within the country. While there is no doubt that the 
government needs to take much greater responsibility for the rights of its workers, as it must for the 
rights of all its citizens, the present state of governance in the country means that this is unlikely to 
happen in the foreseeable future. 
On the other hand, if the objective of these efforts is to build the export garment sector in Bangladesh 
as ‘an island of good governance …in an ocean of mal-governance’ (Sobhan, p. 5), this may well be 
within the realms of possibility. Whether the BGMEA can provide the horizontal form of governance that 
has helped it to pursue its membership’s interests in the past (Khan, 2013) to compensate for state 
regulatory failure in relation to workers’ rights is not clear since it is largely led by those most resistant 
to regulation. But employers would need to take coordinated action, with or without the BGMEA, to 
work towards achievable labour standards within the industry as their contribution to a shared 
responsibility model. 
These efforts, if successful, will have repercussions for the structure of industry. It is likely that only the 
elite segment of the RMG sector can meet the necessary standards of ‘good governance’. The 
suggestion by Barret et al. that buyers reform their purchasing practices and reward high-performance 
suppliers with longer-term contracts, larger-order volumes and more favourable pricing is likely to 
hasten the bifurcation of the industry. Smaller factories that are unable to meet the necessary standards 
will either close down or disappear into the ocean of unregistered informal activities that make up the 
bulk of the country’s economy. It is not clear how many factories have closed down because of inability 
or delay in addressing current remediation requirements under AA but media estimates suggest around 
400 factories had closed by 2014 with repercussions for about 150,000 workers (Hossain, 2014). 
Civil society has also featured in various recommendations about the improvement of labour standards 
in Bangladesh. Labour activists tend to focus primarily on trade unions as best placed to fight for 
workers’ rights. Here again, given the history of trade unionism in Bangladesh, progress has been slow. 
However, a ‘floodlight’ perspective on the problem would take account not only of the vertical 
dimension of value chains but also of their horizontal dimensions, namely the broader socio-economic 
context in which production takes place. From this perspective, efforts to build politically independent 
unions, however discouraging, would not be regarded as futile but part of the painful process of building 
a strong and active civil society. 
Zajak (2017), for instance, points out the presence of Accord provided a ‘shadow of protection’ to 
efforts by some of the newer unions in the garment sector to stand up for workers’ grievances. She also 
notes that interaction with international organizations and alliances also increased the strategizing skills 
of union leaders. These skills and experiences are unlikely to disappear when Accord and Alliance come 
to an end just as the struggle for workers’ right did not come into existence with their inception. As we 
noted, our earlier study had found sporadic examples of workers engaging in factory-wide collective 
actions, sometimes planned, sometimes spontaneously, which frequently spilled over into the streets. 
Such actions testified to the growth of ‘practical’ as opposed to a ‘discursive’ class consciousness 
among these workers (Rahman and Langford, 2012), one that was not in evidence in the 1980s and 
1990s but had clearly evolved over time. It is this practical consciousness that was at play in the massive 
strike that took place in 2006 and has continued to be at play in subsequent agitations. 
Nevertheless, as FNV Mondial (2016) concluded, Bangladesh trade unions do not currently represent a 
strong countervailing power when it comes to promoting and enforcing labour legislation despite 
several years of efforts by international labour organizations. Efforts to build trade unions are likely to 
continue, but for local activists, it is important to broaden efforts to build voice and organization beyond 
trade unions and beyond the garment sector because what happens to workers’ rights in the garment 
sector is closely bound up with what happens to the rights of citizens in the wider society. Other sectors 
of civil society engaged with the promotion of democratic processes and legal justice in Bangladesh have 
frequently engaged with the garment sector as part of their activities. They can be instrumental in 
helping to strengthen and expand the potential held out, for instance, by the setting up of elected WPCs 
within garment factories. In short, the process of building state accountability for the rights of workers 
in Bangladesh needs to be carried out as part and parcel of efforts to build a broader culture of rights 
within the country. 
Conclusion: diversify and conquer? 
Bangladesh moved into the export garment sector when the opportunity arose not simply because of its 
comparative advantage in garment manufacturing but because of its absolute advantage, given that it 
was, and remains, a low-wage, labour-abundant economy. The rapid development of the sector, and its 
contribution to the country’s growth rates and foreign exchange earnings, appeared to hold out the 
promise of helping the country to transition from aid dependency to greater self-reliance through trade. 
But while it has gone from the handful of factories that existed in its early years to becoming the 
second largest exporter of garments after China, it is evident that the market conditions under which it 
has to compete have steadily worsened as the fast fashion business model has come to dominate global 
value chains. It is by no means clear that employers in the industry would have voluntarily improved 
labour standards in their factories if the terms on which they supply their garments had improved over 
time but what is clear is that their ability to do so has been severely constrained by the increasingly 
exploitative business practices of global buyers. 
Moreover, access to the markets of the richer countries of the world remains governed by such 
instruments as the Generalized System of Preferences and the EU’s Everything But Arms which allow 
the richer countries to determine how they will interpret the rules of trade that they have helped to put 
in place. Smaller countries like Bangladesh, especially those with little geo-political significance, are 
compelled to maintain ‘politically serviceable relationships’ (Sobhan, p.6) with these countries in order 
to receive trade privileges, but are always aware that these can be withdrawn at the political discretion 
of their governments. Consequently Bangladesh has moved from a position of aid dependence to one of 
trade dependence as it seeks to lobby countries like the USA to remove tariff barriers to its exports 
(Sobhan, 2003).  
The future of the Bangladesh export garment sector as a source of jobs does not look bright. We have 
noted that many factories have closed down as a result of recent efforts to improve health, safety and 
working conditions in the industry. Many workers have lost their jobs and more are likely to do so as 
efforts to build the industry as an island of good governance continue: without a fairer distribution of 
profits, improvements in the quality of jobs in the garment sector inevitably imply fewer jobs. 
Not surprisingly, there have been efforts by the Bangladesh government itself and by others to explore 
the options for diversification into other higher value-added manufacturing industries that can help to 
reduce its dependence on garments. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss what these might 
be but diversification is unlikely to be easy. I will conclude by quoting from an Action Aid report (2015) 
as to the challenges that Bangladesh faces in any effort to ‘diversify and conquer’, given its position as a 
rule-taker rather than a rule-maker in the global economic order: 
Today, the provisions of World Trade Organisation (WTO) law and trade and investment 
agreements prevent developing countries from using many of the policy tools that today’s 
rich economies relied on to industrialise, such as import quotas, subsidies and tariffs. LDC 
leaders’ hands are tied and cannot easily target economic activities to transform the 
economy. For example, Bangladesh is highly constrained by having to reduce tariffs and 
custom duties, remove quantitative restrictions and relax local content requirements of 
products. Other WTO rules are medium constraining, and include government procurement, 
intellectual property and export subsidies in agriculture. A third set of rules, regulating 
devaluations, investment incentives, trade finance and export taxes are the least 
constraining of them all but are nonetheless there. An economy that is increasingly open to 
free trade and regulated by the rules listed above makes it difficult for domestic businesses 
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